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Declassified on: 201506

C2 PLANS

Threat Assessment

2 July 2005

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THREAT

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- **The Antagonists:**
  - Principally Sunni Arab Extremists and Former Regime Elements
  - Sunni Arab Rejectionists. . .still centered on FRE
  - Shi'a Extremists are presently dormant. . .but can return to violence

- **Nature of the insurgency is changing:**
  - AQIZ and other Sunni Arab Extremists must step-up their efforts
  - FRE are taking a dual-tracked approach
  - SAR some are taking a wait-and-see approach

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Pages 3 through 4 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
1.4b, 1.4d

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DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE - FF MOVEMENT



1.4b, 1.4c, 1.4d, (b)(6)

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FOREIGN FIGHTER VIGNETTE

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

DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE – FF MOVEMENT

IN	STAGING	CROSSING BORDER INTO IRAQ	MOVEMENT STAGED BAGHDAD	TARGET CONFIRMATION	ATTACK
1.4a					
DAY 0	DAY 1 - 2	DAY 3 - 4	DAY 5 - 8	DAY 9	DAY 10

Nationality.....Syrian
Age.....22
Education.....HS
Occupation.....Laborer
Motivation....Fight Infidels



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BORDER ASSESSMENT

- *Disruptin ke areas* and identified smuggling networks along the 1.4b, 1.4d border will *significantly degrade* the ability by AQIZ to sustain operations

- The porous borders provide the AQIZ Network and FRE unrestricted access to foreign fighters, finances, weapons, and supplies

- Shi'a Extremists receive funding, weapons, and training from 1.4b, 1.4d

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KEY CITIES

- Key Cities – control will strengthen among the Iraqi people. . .and the international community a perception of legitimacy for TNA and constitutional process

  – MNF-I: 9 (*Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Ramadi, North Babil, Baquabah, Sammara, Fallujah, Najaf*)

  – MNC-I: 21 (*Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Ramadi, North Babil, Baquabah, Sammara, Fallujah, Najaf,* ***Tall Afar, Bayji, Tikrit, Al Qaim, Balad, Karbala, Kut, Diwanniyah, Samawah, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Basrah****)*

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
SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI
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9 Key Cities
MOSUL
KIRKUK
SAMARRA
BAQUBA
RAMADI
BAGHDAD
FALLUJAH
NORTH BABIL
NAJAF
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City Assessment

- **Mosul** - The threat level in Mosul remains high. There is still a possibility of spectacular attacks.
- **Kirkuk** - Attacks in Kirkuk have remained steady with approximately 70% against CF.
- **Samarra** - Attack numbers are among the highest of cities in northern Salah ad Din Province. Insurgent activity, however, remains consistent with identified trends.

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High Significant Medium Moderate Low

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City Assessment (cont)

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- **Ba'qubah** - Overall insurgent activity in Baqubah remains at a moderate level. Attacks still appear to be financially motivated as the economic situation remains in turmoil.

- **Baghdad** - Insurgents have demonstrated an increased inclination to conduct complex attacks. Attacks have risen since early April and will continue to increase as the political process continues toward the development of the constitution and elections.

High Significant Medium Moderate Low

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City Assessment (cont)

- **North Babil** - The primary threat in the North Babil areas remains directed against MSR and ASR traffic with IED and VBIED composing the most effective attacks.

- **Fallujah** - Insurgents are attempting to reestablish themselves in Fallujah in the same manner employed in late 2003 and early 2004. Insurgent cells/groups continue to emerge in and around the city with multiple ties to Baghdad.

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City Assessment (cont)

- **Ramadi** - With a desire to gain political influence and power in Ramadi, local insurgent leaders continue to discuss possible negotiations with CF to enter the legitimate political process.

- **Najaf** - The new Governor appears to be attempting to resolve provincial issues, but the CoP position still needs to be adequately filled.

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INFRASTRUCTURE

- **Insurgents target key infrastructure to discredit the ITG and for IO Opportunities to bolster their cause and recruitment**
- **Tribes and Criminals attack key infrastructure purely for economic gain**
- **Corrupt Iraq Oil Industry officials assist both insurgents and criminals by providing information for profit**

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
TARGETED NODES:
• Kirkuk Crude PLs
• Al Fathah
• Bayji Refinery
• Thar Thar
• Baghdad Refinery
• Mussaib PS
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ELECTRIC POWER NETWORK
18 Apr 05
High Priority 400 kV Line
Medium Priorty 400 kV Line
Low Priority 132 kV Line
Power Plant
Substation
TALL AFAR
MOSUL
KIRKUK
BAYJI
TIKRIT
SAMARRA
AL QAIM
BALAD
BAQUBA
RAMADI
BAGHDAD
FALLUJAH
RUTBAH
N. BABIL
NAJAF
OIL & GAS NETWORK
18 Apr 05
Product Storage
Crude Storage
Pumping Station
Port Terminal Facility
Major Refinery
High Priority Corridor
Medium Priority Corridor
Low Priority Corridor
Oil Field
ATTACK CONCENTRATIONS – OIL & POWER
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INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENT

- Insurgents will continue to attack Iraqi oil and power lines in order to influence the relationship between the ITG/CF and the Iraqi people. 'Simple' attacks will impact power generation, fuel supplies as well as also oil export revenues.

- The lack of specialized knowledge required to carry out attacks on infrastructure means that small groups with access to funds can hire the unemployed and disaffected to carry out activities as required.

- Insurgents remain capable of relocating and refocusing their attacks as required making it increasingly difficult to capture or kill those responsible.

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IED / VBIED / SVBIED

- **IEDs and VBIEDs (to include SVBIEDs) are the weapon of choice by the Terrorists and Insurgents**
  - **Precision Targeting**
  - **High casualty producing**
  - **Affords insurgents flexibility with a relatively simple weapon to produce**
  - **Effects exploited for IO and recruitment**

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Suicide Vehicle Borne IED CYCLE

Timeline



Phase	Phase I: Obtain Support	Phase 2: Assembly & Planning	Phase 3: Rehearsal	Phase 4: Execution	Phase 5: Post-Attack
Phase Actions	Recruit and smuggle suicide drivers **(Primarily from outside Iraq)** Acquire and stage VBIED components: • Munitions • Triggering Device • Vehicle(s)	VBIED Construction **Security of Safehouse/ Garages** Selection of target Coordination with other cells	Reconnaissance of target Driver training & rehearsal	Final Target Reconnaissance Coordination of attack via PMR/HPCP Film attack	Egress from area Issue claim of responsibility Release film (internet/TV)
	AIF Cell leader coordinates with supplier, financier, and bombmaker to acquire materials and personnel	**Bombmaker** assembles VBIED and hands off to cell; Cell leader arranges for security and segregation of drivers and vehicles	Cell leader coordinates and leads pre-attack preparations	Attack may be against pre-planned target or target of opportunity; trigger may be initiated by driver or other vehicle	Non VBIED elements return to safehouse; exploit attack; begin planning for next attack

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IED / VBIED / SVBIED ASSESSMENT

- AQIZ will maintain focus on MNF, ISF and the Iraqi populace believed to be supporting the Coalition

- The use of VBIED & SVBIED attacks on the local populace by Sunni Extremists is meant to incite sectarian violence and divide the population along pre-existing ethnic and religious lines

- FRE and SAR elements will continue to use IEDs along MSRs & ASRs IOT inflict casualties to MNF and avoid excessive collateral damage on the local populace

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OPERATIONAL SITEMP

1 July 2005



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ASSESSMENT - FUTURE OF THE INSURGENCY

- AMZQ / JBR will continue to take advantage of porous borders IOT deliver lethal and precision attacks with VBIED and SVBIEDs. Attacks against Coalition, ISF, and Civilians will likely increase IOT to deny the ISF and ITG the ability to establish a reasonably safe and secure environment prior to Constitutional Referendum and Elections.

- Insurgents will attempt to sustain the insurgency by soliciting support from poorly educated, unemployed males and capitalizing on Sunni feelings of exclusion resulting from the government failing to live up to perceived expectations (i.e. lack of essential services, no improvement in the security situation and high unemployment).

- FRE will likely pursue a dual-track strategy using political means to participate and influence new government while continuing to support the insurgency. The FRE will look for opportunities to place supporters into key military and security positions.

- Insurgents (FRE / SAR) DO NOT have a set timeline. They are in the fight for the long-term and believe that the Coalition will commit to this effort for no more than 5 years. By maintaining a campaign of terror and intimidation the insurgents hope to take over a weakened government following Coalition's departure.

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